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Introduction 
The mandatory evaluation of the information security software and hardware (ISSH) 
used for informatization objects is performed as ISSH certification testing. The conformity 
evaluation is also performed at the stages of acceptance testing, informatization objects 
validation, and information security efficiency control. ISSH requirements are defined in the 
regulatory and procedural guidelines for regulators, but those, however, either lack the 
descriptions of testing methods or provide them in a qualitative description manner, and this 
hinders automation and optimization of ISSH conformity evaluation. This presentation 
discusses formalization of both general and particular methods of ISSH conformity evaluation 
so as to enable one to define time, cost, and exhaustiveness factors of ISSH testing. 
1. Formal Metabasis of Conformity Evaluation  
An ISSH set is a set of hardware and software data processing components acting 
either independently or as parts of other systems designed for either prevention or setting a 
considerable obstacle to unauthorized access to information [1]. ISSH includes a number of 
security subsystems, such as identification, authentication, access isolation, integrity control, 
logging, and other mechanisms designed to fight actual information security threats. 
Let us discuss an ISSH test. Let us grant that { }iR r  is a subset of requirements for 
ISSH   while { }iT t  is a set of processes used to test the conformity to the requirements. 
The test process designing method will be described as the following transformation: 
:M R T. Function M , on the basis of requirement ir R  and information on the 
implementation of ISSH   under test, generates test process it T  performed for testing the 
ISSH compliance with requirement ir R . As a rule, function M  for ISSH   under test is a 
bijection. 
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Any test process it T  is characterized by the following: the purpose, the workflow, 
the results to be registered, and the criteria of the positive decision. 
The purpose contains the description of the intention to test ISSH conformity to the 
requirements. The workflow defines the set of instructions to be performed by the tester to 
initialize the ISSH under test and generate the input sequence to the ISSH. The results of test 
processes are registered with different software testing means, such as network traffic 
generation and interception tools, bulk memory search applications, and access isolation 
testing applications. The criteria of the positive decision must contain the test processes model 
results. The test is to compare the model and actual test results in order to enable a decision of 
the ISSH conformity or non-conformity. 
Let us introduce operators of meeting the requirements RF  and correctness of test 
results CF  for the given , ,i ir t . 
Operator of meeting requirement ir  for ISSH   : {0,1}:RF R  

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Operator of correctness of test process it  for ISSH   : {0,1}:CF T  

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,for  passedly successful  test if ,1
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Operator CF  indicates successful or unsuccessful test results for ISSH  , that is, 
whether the actual test results are equivalent to the model results indicated in the process 
description. 
Set of five objects {,, , , }RCRMFF  will be the ISSH test method, where R  is a 
set of requirements for ISSH  , M  is a test process designing method, and RF  and CF  are 
operators of meeting the requirements and correctness of test processes respectively, and for 
ir R   (,) (, (,)R i C iFr FMr holds. 
The method presupposes three stages: planning, testing, and result analysis. At the 
planning stage, the specifications and ISSH features are analyzed. Before testing, the testers 
must confirm that the ISSH specifications contain the creator’s claim of ISSH conformity to 
requirements R , that is ( , ) 1R iF r   for ir R  . On the basis of data obtained in 
specifications analysis and ISSH test runs, and the requirements, a set of test processes 
{ }iT t  is generated, where ( , )i it M r  . { }iT t  test processes are used for testing of 
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the system. For each test process it , the results to be registered are obtained. At the analysis 
stage a set of ordered couples  , ( , )i C it F t  of actual and model results, is obtained. For 
ISSH  , the conformity to requirements 12{, ,...,...,}i nRrr r r  is declared is: 
 
1
(,)(,(,)
n
R i C i
i
FrFMrn

 , 
that is, the test has proved the conformity of actual ISSH capabilities to the ones either 
claimed by the specifications or required by regulations. 
2. Methods of Testing of Information Security Tools Conformity to Information 
Security Requirements  
The basic document containing ISSH requirements is the regulatory document on 
computational technology products by the Russian State Technical Committee
1
 [1]. By this 
document, 7 protection classes are established and requirements are formulated to 
discretionary and mandatory access controls, memory wiping, module isolation, document 
marking, protection of input and output to an alienated material carrier, user-device matching, 
identification and authentication, events logging, integrity control, etc. Let us discuss the 
formalized test procedures of the most resource-hungry requirements of the above RIST = 
{r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,r6} taken from this document. 
2.1. Particular Methods for Discretionary Access Isolation Testing 
The purpose is to test whether the ISSH functional opportunities meet the 
requirements for discretionary access isolation, and if yes, to what extent. 
Let us introduce definitions to be used for description of the test process. Let us grant 
that },...,,...,,{ 21 ni SSSSS  is a set of test access subjects, },...,,...,,{ 21 mj OOOOO  is a set of 
test access objects, and },...,,...,{ 21 lk RRRRR  is a set of possible access rights (e.g., view, 
saving, deletion, etc.). Let us define the access matrix as )( ijmM  , Rmij  , where ijm  is a set 
of access rights of the test subject iS  to the test object jO . The matrix row corresponds to the 
subject iS , and the column to the object jO . The element at the crossing of the row and 
column contains the set of access rights Rmij   of the corresponding subject to the 
corresponding object. 
                                                 
1
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The operator of the possession by the subject of the right to access to the object in the 
matrix will be : , , , {0,1}:M i j kFMSOR  




no. if 0,
,object   toright  access  thehas subj ct  if ,1
,
jki
kjiM
ORS
),R,OS(MF  
The operator of the actual possession by the subject of the right to access to the object 
will be : , , {0,1}:fact i j kFSOR  




no. if 0,
,object   toright  access  theh s subj ct  if ,1 jki
kjifact
ORS
),R,O(SF  
The sequence of the performed operations may be as follows: 
1. Creation of test subjects 1 2{, ,..., ,..., }i nS SS S S  and objects of access 
1 2{, ,.., ,.., }j mOOOOO . Testing will be performed for all possible subjects and objects of 
access, and the list of subjects and objects will be defined on the basis of the ISSH 
specifications analysis. 
2. Adjustment of the access rights for subjects of the ISSH under test to the test 
objects under protection. This operation presupposes the adjustment of the access matrix 
( )ijM m , ijm R . In the testing, all possible subject-to-object access rights and their 
combinations are checked. 
3. Testing of ISSH configurations: the check of the actual possession of the right kr  
by the subject jS  with relation to the object iO ; thus, all values of the operator ),R,O(SF kjifact  
are checked for any kji ,, . The check is performed with the test access attempts, such as 
viewing, saving, or deletion of objects by subjects. 
4. Comparing the actual access rights with those defined by the access matrix. 
The results of the test to be registered are: 
1. The set of test access subjects },...,,...,,{ 21 ni SSSSS , the set of test access objects 
},...,,...,{ 21 mj OOOOO , and the set of possible access rights },...,,...,{ 21 lk RRRRR . 
2. The results of adjustment of access isolation rules, that is, access matrix )( ijmM  , 
Rmij  . 
3. Results of the check of the actual possession of the right kR  by the subject jS  
with relation to object iO , that is, values of the operator ),R,O(SF kjifact  for all kji ,, . 
Let us define the criterion of positive decision: as a result of comparison of actual and 
required access rights defined by the access matrix, they must coincide: 
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i,j,k),R,O(SF),R,OS(MF kjifactkjiM  for  ,   
The check of the set access rights is performed through attempts of open and close 
access by the subjects to objects with registration of results of these attempts as successful or 
not. 
The analysis of the obtained data is performed through comparison of the access 
attempts results with the expected results defined in the test access matrix. 
Similar to discretionary access isolation testing, the user-device matching testing is 
performed, but in this case different input and output devices are considered access objects. 
2.2. A Particular Method of Mandatory Access Control Testing 
Let us introduce definitions to be used for description of the test process. Let us grant 
that },...,,...,,{ 21 ni SSSSS  is a set of test access subjects, },...,,...,,{ 21 mj OOOOO  is a set of 
test access objects, },...,,...,{ 21 lk mmmmM  is a set of classification labels (classification 
levels) of access subjects and objects (classification labels has an hierarchy: 
llkkk mmmmmmm   11121 ,...,,..., ), Oim  is a classification label of the i
th
 access object 
and Sjm  is classification label of the j
th
 access subject.  
Let us introduce the operators }1,0{,: jiREADOSF  of checking the right to reading and 
}1,0{,: jiWRITEOSF  of checking the right to writing possessed by subject iS  with relation to 
object jO : 




no. if 0,
,object   viewing tacc ss  theh s subj ct  if ,1
),(
jj
jjREAD
OS
OSF  




no. if 0,
,object  editing  taccess  theh s subj c   if ,1
),(
jj
jjWRITE
OS
OSF  
The sequence of the performed operations may be as follows: 
1. Creating test access subjects 1 2{, ,..., ,..., }i nS SS S S  and objects 
1 2{, ,.., ,.., }j mOOOOO . 
2. Assigning classification labels 1 2{, ,.., ,.., }k lMmmmm  to the access subjects 
(by transformation MSFS :  which permits to calculate the classification level of any access 
subject, i. e. SiiS mSF )( ). 
3. Assigning classification labels 1 2{, ,.., ,.., }k lMmmmm  to the access objects (by 
transformation MOFO :  which permits to calculate the classification level of any access 
object OjjO mOF )( ). 
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4. Performing the following test object access attempts by the subjects: 
  reading data of the access objects by the access subjects, i. e. calculation of 
: , {0,1}READ i jF SO  for ,i j ; 
  writing data to the access objects by the access subjects, i. e. calculation of 
: , {0,1}WRITE i jF SO  for ,i j . 
5. Checking if the obtained results conform to the rules of the ticket-oriented access 
isolation. 
The results of the test to be registered are: 
1. The set of test access subjects },...,,...,,{ 21 ni SSSSS , the set of test access 
objects },...,,...,,{ 21 mj OOOOO , the set of classification labels (classification levels) of 
access subjects and objects },...,,...,{ 21 lk mmmmM . 
2. The results of adjustment of access isolation rules, that is, transformations 
MSFS : , MOFO :  (classification labels of access subjects and objects). 
3. Results of the check of the actual possession of the right to writing and reading by 
the subject jS  with relation to the object iO , that is, values of operators : , {0,1}READ i jF SO  
and : , {0,1}WRITE i jF SO  for ji, . 
As a result of the check of the ticket-oriented access isolation rules, the following data 
are obtained: 
  the access subject jS  of the classification level Sjm  may read data of the access 
object iO  of the classification level Oim  if and only if the classification level of the access 
subject jS  is either higher or equal to the classification level of the access object iO , i. e. for 
,i j , 1READ i jF (S,O) , if and only if Sj Oim m ; 
  the access subject jS  of the classification level Sjm  may write data to the access 
object iO  of the classification level Oim  if and only if the classification level of the access 
object iO  is either higher or equal to the classification level of the access subject jS , i. e. for 
ji, , 1),O(SF jiWRITE  if and only if  SjOi mm  . 
In a similar way, the test of the protection of input and output to an alienated material 
carrier is performed. 
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2.3. A Particular Method of Memory Cleaning Testing  
Let us introduce definitions to be used for description of the test process. Let us grant 
that },...,,...,,{ 21 li aaaaA  is a set of memory areas under test (short term memory, hard drive 
partitions, external carriers, etc.), and S  is a test sequence of symbols unique for each area A 
of the memory. For the description of the testing process, we will use the operator of presence 
of the test sequence in the memory :}1,0{,: SaF icheck  




no. if 0,
, areain present  is  sequence if ,1
),(
j
jcheck
aS
SaF  
The sequence of operations is as follows: 
1. Adjustment of memory cleaning applications. 
2. Placing the test data into the memory (a unique sequence of text symbols S ). 
3. Locating the test data within the memory (address, disc partition, etc.). 
4. Memory relocation (release) with the use of the standard bench means. 
5. Control of the test data being present in or absent from the memory (a repeat 
search and addressing using addresses defined at the initial stage); defining the value of 
,S)(aF icheck . 
6. Results analysis. 
7. Applying assessment criteria. 
The tests results to be registered are as follows: 
1. Results of memory cleaning applications adjustment. 
2. Results of the check for the test data being present in the memory after relocation 
(release). 
The criterion of positive decision is as follows: the sequence S  of symbols loaded into 
the memory must not be found again after relocation (release), i. e. iicheck a,S)(aF ,0 . 
2.4. A Particular Method of Module Isolation Testing  
The isolation of modules follows from the fact that each process run by a user has its 
individual addressing space isolated from any other process run by other users. 
The sequence of operations is as follows: 
1. Running applications or processes on behalf of different users. 
2. Access attempts to the process memory run by a user on behalf of the user.  
3. Access attempts to the process memory run by a user on behalf of the other users.  
4. Access attempts to the PC real memory. 
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5. Results analysis. 
6. Applying assessment criteria. 
The test results to be registered are facts of access attempts to the processes' memory 
run by other users and access attempts to the PC real memory. 
The criterion of the positive decision is as follows: within the test, no access to the 
processes' memory run by other users or to the PC real memory occurred. 
2.5. A Particular Method of Access Subject Identification and Authentication 
Testing 
Let us introduce definitions to be used for description of the test process. Granting that 
A  is the alphabet of passwords and IDs of ISSH users, the user will be designated as 
*AIDid  , and the password as 
*APWDpwd  ; the user's account USRusri  will be 
characterized by the sequence ),( kji pwdidusr . Let us introduce the operator of correctness of 
authentication data :}1,0{: USRFAUT  




.no if , 0
,granted IST  toaccess ,1
)(usrFAUT  
The following sequence of operations may be used for testing identification and 
authentication tools correctness: 
1. Addressing the ISSH identification and authentication means and creating a set of 
access subject's accounts ,...},{ 21usrusrUSR . 
2. Running queries for identification and authentication with the use of different 
combinations of authentication data: registered or unregistered IDs, or true or false passwords 
),( kji pwdidtry . 
3. Obtained data analysis. 
The test results to be registered are: 
1. ISSH configurations: the set of access subjects' accounts USR . 
2. Data obtained in test queries for identification and authentication: the set 
),...}(),({ 21 tryFtryF AUTAUT . 
The positive decision criteria are: 
1. On entry of the registered ID and password, the user is granted an access to the 
protected data: ( )1AUT i iFtry tryADM . 
2. On entry of an unregistered ID and/or wrong password, the user is not granted an 
access to the protected data: ADMtrytryF iiAUT 0)( . 
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The check of the reliability of the user identification and authentication processes' 
connection with all operations performed by the user is done within the tests of discretionary 
and ticket-based access control. After each check, the logs of events are analysed. 
The check is considered a success if the audit log contains records about all access 
attempts and all operations performed by all users (security administrators included) that 
occurred within the tests described in the above paragraphs. In addition, each logging-in entry 
must specify the user ID employed in the access attempt and/or under which the user was 
logged on and performed different operations in the system. 
2.6. A Particular Method of Integrity Control Testing  
Granting that },...,,{ 21 nfilefilefileFILE  is a set of ISSH files (configuration files or 
software module), let us introduce operators of the integrity violation MODF  and ISSH file 
integrity control INTF . 
The operator of integrity violation :}1,0{: FILEFMOD  




.no if 0,
,in testing violatedintegrity  file ,1
)( fileFMOD  
The operator of ISSH file integrity control :}1,0{: FILEFINT  




.no if , 0
,violatedintegrity  f le ,1
)(fileFINT  
Let us designate the set of ISSH files modified within the test as 
},...,,{ 21
 nfilefilefileFILE , granting that the file ifile  is transformed into 

ifile . When ISSH 
integrity control is tested, the following sequence of operations may be performed: 
1. Configuration of integrity control applications (reaction to integrity violation, 
integrity control method, check-out period, test conditions, etc.), and identification of the 
ISSH file set ,...},{ 21filefileFILE . 
2. Introducing changed into ISSH files (configuration changes, substitution or 
modification of the executable files, etc.), the result being the set of modified files 
,...},{ 21
 filefileFILE . 
3. ISSH file integrity check initialization (creation of conditions under which the 
ISSH performs integrity control). 
4. Analysis of the ISSH reaction to its software or data integrity violation. 
The test results to be registered are: 
1. ISSH file set ,...},{ 21filefileFILE . 
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2. Modified ISSH file set ,...},{ 21
 filefileFILE . 
3. ISSH reaction to integrity violation: ),...(),( 21
 fileFfileF INTINT  
The criterion of positive decision is: the ISSH reveals all facts of integrity violation: 
)()( iMODiINT fileFfileF 

 for ],1[ ni . 
3. Recommendations for Testing Processes Optimization  
Our experience of conducting different ISTs tests by our accredited test laboratory 
shows that the main issue is the growth of time and material expenditures on standard 
operations while the newly developed ISSH complexity grows along with the number of 
platforms and environments where these ISTs can operate. For example, for a discretionary 
access isolation testing, one will need to perform S O R   standard operations.  
In general, it can be shown that the time   needed for a test grows exponentially: 
, where n  is the number of requirements under test, w  is the number of test units 
(for example, a user account), and v  is the number of possible values that the factor under test 
may have. 
The problem  of ISSH testing optimization may be formulated as follows. Granting 
that  is the time needed for experts to test the ISSH   with the use of the 
testing process it  and the transformation  reflects the expenditures of the 
ISSH   testing against requirements R . The optimization (minimization of time within a 
certain expenditures limit) will be as follows: 
 
 
, min,
, ,
i
i
i M
i
t
Cr C
 






 
where MC  is the limit set to expenditures. 
As methods permitting to optimize testing, the following ways may be suggested. 
1. Combining different test types. When an ISSH is tested, we recommend performing 
certain tests simultaneously. For example, the events logging subsystem testing can be 
combined with access isolation control and identification/authentication testing. 
2. Testing with combinatorial overlapping methods. Testing all possible combinations 
of input effects to check the software behaviour in full, is very labour-consuming. The 
combinatorial overlapping testing is an approach that not only decreases the costs and 
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increases the efficiency of tests, but also reduces the probability of error in the software. The 
idea is generally as follows: a failure of software is in the majority of cases is not caused by 
an isolated incorrect input parameter but by a combination of two or more input parameters 
(from two to six parameters, as follows from empirical data). The combinatorial overlapping 
may be practicable for both configuration and input parameters testing. 
3. Using software testing tools. To reduce time expenditures, software should be used 
that permits to automate testing. Both ready-made software products presented in the software 
market of today and script-based home-made programmes may be used [2,3]. 
Conclusion 
The formalization of the ISSH security subsystems testing methods and processes 
presented in this paper will make automation of ISSH and secured products conformity 
assessment easier. 
The main problem that companies encounter when testing the products is the increase 
in time and cost expenditures caused by a large number of similar-type tests of the object's 
functions to be performed on all possible input data domains. The suggested methods will 
permit to reduce expenditures on conformity assessment and solve the problem of assessment 
time minimization within a certain expenditure limit. 
The conceptual approach to the conformity assessment formalization may be 
recommended to anyone performing all types of tests of hardware, software, and secured 
systems [4-10]. 
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